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Surely unity is what we need to complete our work of regen-
eration... It is union, obviously; but such union will come
about through sensible planning and well-directed actions
rather than by divine magic.'
Sim6n Bolivar, September 6, 1815
I. INTRODUCTION
Sim6n Bolivar's declaration nearly two-centuries ago re-
mains prophetic. Unity, this time in the form of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas2 (FTAA), will come about only through the
sensible planning and well-directed actions of the leaders who
attended the Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida on De-
cember 9-10, 1994.' Central among the obstacles faced in at-
tempting to integrate the national economies in the region and
establish the FTAA is a workable origin rule.4 Origin rules are
used to determine which goods traded among members of a free
trade area are granted preferential tariff treatment.
A review of the problems associated with country of origin
determinations might suggest to those who are skeptical of the
1. Sim6n Bolivar, Carta de Jamaica (Sept. 6, 1815), reprinted in SIM6N
BoLIvAR: THE HOPE OF THE UNIVERSE 115 (Arturo Uslar Pietri ed., 1983).
2. Although a number of names have been used for the latest integration
effort, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor eliminated alternatives such as the
Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area and America's Free Trade Area during the
December 1994 Summit of the Americas. "We have a number of acronyms that fly
around. What everyone agreed to unanimously is Free Trade Area of the Americas,
which I think is quite appropriate." Summit of the Americas: Press Conference with
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Federal News Service, Dec. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Curnws File. For a further discussion of the
Summit of the Americas, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
3. The Declaration of Principles that was issued following the Summit stated
that the leaders who attended the meeting will work toward the implementation of
the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which will create a hemispheric free trade
area. See U.S. GoV'T, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
PLAN OF ACTION (Dec. 11, 1994), reprinted in Daily Report for Executives, Dec. 13,
1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. For further discussion of the
Summit of the Americas, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Chile & G3: The Group of Three (Mexico, Colombia, and Venezue-
la) might soon become the Group of Four, Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico
& NAFTA Report, April 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lan File RM-
94-04 (identifying lack of agreement between Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico on
the rules of origin as the obstacle to implementation of the G3 accord).
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likelihood of an FTAA that "divine magic" is the only possibility
to achieve integration in the Americas. This article is premised
on an alternative view. It provides a "sensible plan" and sug-
gests some "well-directed actions" for Bolivar's successors in
their quest for economic integration in the Americas.
II. A SAMPLING OF THE ORIGIN RULE PROBLEM: THE HONDA
CASE
The Honda case was essentially a set of rulings by the U.S.
Customs Service issued during an audit of Honda's North Amer-
ican operations.5 The controversy arose out of the tariff treat-
ment of Honda Civics and their component parts under the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement 6 (FTA). Following the
audit of Honda's operations, U.S. Customs issued a retroactive
multimillion-dollar invoice to Honda Motor Company for tariffs
that the agency said should have been paid on Civics shipped
from Canada to the United States. This action by U.S. Customs
generated substantial controversy. For some, the Honda case
even promoted doubts about the FTA as a whole.7 A review of
the facts of the case helps to explain those reactions and exem-
plifies the difficulties created by the rules which governed coun-
try of origin determinations under the Canada-U.S. FTA.
Honda was the first of the Japanese automobile companies
to establish "transplants" in the United States; the automaker
began manufacturing automobile engines in Marysville, Ohio in
1982." The Ohio-built engines, the eventual focal point of the
controversy, were produced using U.S. and Japanese inputs.
Honda of America then shipped the finished engines from Ohio
to a Honda plant in Ontario, Canada where they were incorpo-
rated into the finished product, Honda Civics. Honda of Canada
shipped the overwhelming majority of the Civics to the United
5. U.S. Customs Internal Advice Rulings HQ 000112 (Nov. 14, 1991); HQ
000116 (Nov. 14, 1991); HQ 544833 (Dec. 3, 1991); HQ 544834 (Dec. 3, 1991); HQ
000131 (Dec. 12, 1991); HQ 000155 (Feb. 10, 1992); HQ 000160 (Feb. 27, 1992); HQ
000161 (Feb. 27, 1992). For the details of Honda's operations which are not clear
from the rulings, see, e.g., Frederic P. Cantin & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Ori-
gin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda Case, 87 A.J.I.L. 375, 379-83 (1993).
6. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27
I.L.M. 281 (entered into force in Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA].
7. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 385.




Under the FTA rules of origin, Honda of Canada treated the
engines imported from Ohio to the Canadian plant for incorpora-
tion in the Honda Civics as goods which qualified for
preferential tariff treatment. Similarly, Honda of America
claimed duty-free treatment for the Civics that were assembled
in Canada that it imported for sale in the United States. Both of
Honda's claims were based on the automaker's interpretation of
the FTA origin rules. Honda treated the engines as products of
U.S. origin even though the Ohio-built engines included Japa-
nese components. According to Honda, the sum of U.S. origin
components of each engine and the direct costs of processing in
the U.S. amounted to more than fifty percent of the total engine
value,'0 and therefore, the engines satisfied the fifty percent
North American value content requirement imposed by the
FTA." U.S. Customs agreed that the engines qualified as goods
originating in North America under the FTA origin rules.
The disagreement was over the North American value con-
tent calculation of the finished automobiles - the Civics
assembled in Canada using the Ohio-built engines. U.S. Cus-
toms disagreed with Honda's inclusion of 100% of the value of
the engines in the total North American value content calcula-
tion for the Civics that were shipped to the United States. In
calculating the value content of the automobiles assembled in
Canada, Honda had employed the roll-up 2 rule and included
100% of the value of the engines. Doing so enabled Honda to
assert that the total North American value content of the Civics
exported from Canada to the U.S. was greater than the fifty
percent minimum required for duty-free treatment. 3
When the FTA was implemented, the U.S. and Canada did
not establish a means to ensure uniformity in the interpretation
of the rules of origin. As a result, the Canadian and U.S. govern-
9. Id. at 380.
10. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in the United States, in RULES OF ORIGIN
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 27, 69 (Edwin Vernulst et al. eds.,
1994).
11. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 6, art. 401(2), (4), implemented by United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1988) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA Implementation Act].
12. For a discussion of roll-up, see infra part VIII.A.2.a.
13. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 6, art 401(2), (4).
[Vol. 27:1
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ments became embroiled in a dispute over the Honda case. U.S.
Customs and its Canadian counterpart, Revenue Canada,
reached opposite conclusions regarding the interpretation of the
FTA origin rules and the corresponding tariff treatment of the
Civics. Revenue Canada, like Honda Motor Company, treated
virtually all of the engines manufactured in Ohio and incorpo-
rated into the Civics in Ontario as qualifying for duty-free entry
into Canada under the FTA.'4 While the U.S. Customs Service
agreed, it held that Honda could not count 100% of the value of
the Ohio-built engines imported into Canada for inclusion in the
Civics in the calculation of the North American value content of
the Civics. Rather, using the roll-down 5 rule, U.S. Customs
treated the engines as having zero North American content. 6
Thus, when U.S. Customs excluded the value of the engines
from the value content calculation, the Civics shipped to the
U.S. from Canada did not meet the fifty percent value content
requirement. 7 Consequently, the U.S. Customs Service charged
Honda $17 million for the 2.5% ad valorem back tariffs on Civics
exported from Canada to the United States."8 Canada support-
ed Honda in its bid for tariff-free treatment for the Civics as-
sembled in Canada, and the U.S. challenged Honda's claims.
Eventually, the controversy grew political with the Canadian
Government and Honda pitted against the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice. Canada invoked the FTA dispute resolution procedure, but
this did not result in the creation of a panel nor go beyond the
consultation stage.19 Because North American Free Trade
Agreement 2° (NAFTA) negotiations were nearly complete, the
14. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 381.
15. For a discussion of roll down, see infra part VIII.A.2.b.
16. U.S. Customs Internal Advice Ruling HQ 000131 (Dec. 12, 1991). David
Palmeter criticized the U.S. Customs' exclusion of the Ohio-built engines from the
value content calculation of the Civics, calling the legal analysis "less than convinc-
ing" and "absurd." Palmeter, supra note 10, at 70-71. Others described the analysis
as incomprehensible and suggested that the decision might have been politicized be-
cause it involved Honda, the Japanese automaker with the largest transplant pres-
ence in the United States. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 380. Had Cus-
toms given credit for even the clearly North American content of the engines that
were used in the assembly of the Civics, the cars would have satisfied the fifty
percent regional value content requirement of the FTA. Id. at 382.
17. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 6, art. 401(2), (4).
18. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 381.
19. Id. at 385.
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992 Can.-U.S.-Mexico, 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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U.S. and Canada consented to allow the negotiations to clarify
the rules of origin and resolve the Honda dispute.21
The Honda case provides but one example of the types of
problems created by rules of origin for the signatories to a trade
accord like the Canada-U.S. FTA. Lengthy and costly audits are
ordinarily required when trade accords incorporate origin rules
based on value added requirements. In addition, regional value
content requirements make country of origin determinations
unpredictable due to fluctuations in input prices and exchange
rates. As the Honda case demonstrates, the lack of uniformity in
interpretation of origin rules creates further uncertainty. In
sum, the FTA rules failed to achieve the predictability that those
involved in international business transactions generally hold
dear, created unnecessary costs and administrative burdens, and
hampered the FTA objectives to liberalize trade and draw the
U.S. and Canada into a closer economic relationship.
The experience of the U.S. and Canada in interpreting and
applying the FTA origin rules demonstrates the substantial
technical obstacles to the implementation of an FTAA. Origin
rule problems not only threaten existing trade accords between
close trading partners like Canada and the United States, but
also have stalled recent initiatives undertaken by South
American countries to negotiate and implement economic inte-
gration.22 Notably, the differences in values, legal traditions,
and levels of economic development between the U.S. and the
countries of Latin America are greater than the differences be-
21. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 385. According to Gary Hufbauer and
Jeffrey Schott, the Honda dispute was settled to Canada's satisfaction. The new
NAFTA origin rules will apply to all Honda imports that have not undergone a final
determination by U.S. Customs as to duties owed. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: AN ASSESSMENT 41 (1993). As of February
1993, the dispute over those Honda Civics that had not undergone Customs' final
determination remained to be resolved by a binational panel. Former trade represen-
tative Carla Hills, however, recommended that the NAFTA's implementing legislation
make clear that the NAFTA origin rules apply to on-going disputes like the Honda
case. Id. at 41 n.11.
22. According to Juan Echavarria, the number two ranking member of the
Colombian foreign trade ministry, "Ithe G3 was a regional axis which had visions of
creating a hemispheric free-trade zone." Chile & G3: The Group of Three (Mexico,
Colombia, and Venezuela) might soon become the Group of Four, supra note 4. How-
ever, "the G3 has yet to achieve free trade between its three members even though
this was supposed to be done by the beginning of January [1994]. The three could
not reach a final agreement on rules of origin." Id.
114 [Vol. 27:1
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tween the U.S. and Canada in those areas. It will be difficult for
the national governments of the countries of North and South
America to agree upon a workable set of rules to govern country
of origin determinations. The leaders in the region must learn
from the mistakes that were made and the precedents that were
set in formulating the origin rules embodied in the trade agree-
ments like the FTA and the NAFTA, which are essentially pre-
cursors to the FTAA.23 By doing so, Sim6n Bolivar's successors
will not need to look too far for a means to eliminate a major
obstacle to the creation of the FTAA. An innovative solution to
the origin rule problem can be found in the NAFTA itself.
III. INTRODUCING THE SOLUTION: THE NAFTA COMPUTER RULE
The NAFTA negotiators established two favorable prece-
dents regarding rules of origin. First, they sought to overcome
the problems presented by the Canada-U.S. FTA origin rules
when they formulated the NAFTA origin rules.' In doing so,
the negotiators established a constructive methodological prece-
dent. Despite the fact that the rules that were agreed upon have
been termed "tools of discrimination" and identified as the "main
area where the NAFTA is open to criticism,"2" it is a positive
step that the NAFTA negotiators at least attempted to learn
from the problems that arose out of the operation of the FTA
origin rules. The FTAA negotiators must build on this method-
ological precedent.
More important than the methodological precedent, the
adoption of the NAFTA origin rules created a constructive sub-
stantive precedent. In one of the NAFTA's most unique provi-
23. See infra notes 28, 33, 62 and accompanying text (discussing the NAFTA as
the forerunner to a hemisphere-wide free trade area).
24. According to John P. Simpson, the NAFTA rules were a product of a learn-
ing process. "We are learning some of these lessons from our audits of companies
doing business under the FTA. We are benefitting from this experience and we are
applying the lessons we are learning both to seek modifications to our free trade
agreement with Canada and to devise improved rules for the NAFTA." Enforcing
Rules of Origin Requirements under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
1991: Hearing before the Comm. on Finance of the U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
37 (1991) (prepared statement of John P. Simpson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Regulatory, Tariff, and Trade Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury) [hereinafter
Simpson Statement]. See also 139 Cong. Rec. S16096 (Nov. 18, 1993) (committee
statements on the NAFTA).
25. HUFBAUER & SCHoTr, supra note 21, at 5.
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sions, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. will harmonize their exter-
nal tariffs on computers and related goods.26 Duties will be pay-
able only upon entry into the NAFTA territory once the NAFTA
signatories harmonize their respective tariff rates for such goods
downward to the lowest most-favored-nation rate assessed by
any NAFTA signatory. Within the NAFTA territory, traders may
ship computers and related goods between Canada, Mexico, and
the United States without payment of duties. In effect, comput-
ers receive "common market treatment" under the NAFTA provi-
sions."
Government trade representatives throughout the Americas
can eliminate the complications associated with origin determi-
nations by relying on the innovative computer rule example.
Upon each NAFTA accession on the way to the establishment of
the FTAA,2s negotiators can make it more like a customs union
than a free trade area. Thus, the FTAA may become a reality in
which many goods, if not all, receive common market treatment
when traded within the Americas. In short, the 1992 NAFTA is
for the Americas "akin to" the European Community's 1957
Treaty of Rome.29
26. See NAFTA, supra note 20, vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 308 & Annex 308.1,
Most-Favored-Nation Rates of Duty on Certain Automatic Data Processing Goods and
Their Parts. See infra note 176 for the text of art. 308 and Annex 308.1.
27. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, art. XXIV, paras. 4 & 8, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV GAT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
1-78 (1969) [hereinafter GATI (art. XXIV discusses circumstances under which a
regional trading bloc, in the form of a customs union or a free trade area, is permis-
sible even though contrary to the most-favored-nation principle of art. I).
28. According to Ann Hughes, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce for the
Western Hemisphere, "[wihile recent indications are that the United States will
endorse a 'building block' approach at the summit, including NAFTA accession for
Chile . . . the matter was still under discussion and . . . the countries had not come
to a final decision. The building block approach envisions that some countries, such
as Chile, may be ready to assume NAFTA obligations, while other less developed
countries may be ready for other types of arrangements." NAFTA Commerce Official
Hopes for Agreement at Summit Endorsing NAFTA Accession, INVL TRADE DAILY
(BNA), November 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Bnaitd File [here-
inafter NAFTA Accession]. The fact that Chile began formal negotiations to accede to
the NAFTA in June, 1995 suggests that the U.S. will pursue the building block ap-
proach towards free trade in the Americas. However, the Summit of the America's
Declaration of Principles does not mention enlargement of the NAFTA. See U.S.
GOv'T, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND PLAN OF ACTION,
supra note 3.
29. According to Hufbauer and Schott, "the NAFTA for North America is akin
to the Treaty of Rome," signed in 1957 to establish the European Economic Commu-
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IV. THE PURPOSES AND STRUCTURE OF THIS ARTICLE
While many discussions regarding free trade in the Ameri-
cas are politically or ideologically oriented,"0 this Article focuses
on a technical issue of free trade implementation, or the me-
chanics of integration; the purpose is to examine an issue that
threatens current economic integration initiatives. Specifically,
this Article reviews the problems presented by rules of origin
and identifies a rule for use in the FTAA. Following a presenta-
tion in Part V of a brief history of integration efforts in the
Americas, Part VI elaborates on the purpose of rules of origin
and the growing challenges that they present for negotiators
who must formulate the FTAA rules. Part VII describes several
failed initiatives undertaken nationally and internationally to
create a standard rule of origin. In order to provide a context-
specific understanding of rules of origin, Part VIII describes the
operation of the rules of origin in both the Canada-U.S. FTA and
the NAFTA, two preferential trading arrangements that are
essentially forerunners of the FTAA. Part VIII.B.4 describes the
NAFTA rule of origin for computers in detail and elaborates on
the benefits of its use in the formation of an FTAA for members
and non-members alike.
In conclusion, the Article recommends an extension of the
measures embodied in NAFTA's Article 308 and Annex 308.1,
which provide for the eventual imposition of a common external
tariff (CET) for computers and related goods.3 Each NAFTA
enlargement 2 provides an opportunity for national leaders in
the region to demonstrate that they have learned from the
NAFTA computer rule example. The piece-meal imposition of a
CET is a sensible plan and a well-directed action that will en-
nity. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 21, at 9 n.7. Although Hufbauer and Schott
identify a parallel between the NAFTA and the Treaty of Rome, they distinguish the
two. The goal of the NAFTA is a free trade area with minimal supranational infra-
structure, while the objective of the Treaty of Rome was the creation of a common
market with an extensive institutional infrastructure. Id.
30. See generally Howard Wiarda, The Domestic Politics of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, in 3:12 CSIS POLICY PAPERS ON THE AMERICAS (1992) (identi-
fying various stakeholders in the NAFTA and their arguments for or against the
Agreement).
31. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 308 & Annex 308.1.
32. For a discussion of Chile's pending accession to the NAFTA, see infra notes
61-64, 190-91 and accompanying text.
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able benefits to accrue to the people of the Americas on the
order of those benefits sought by Sim6n Bolivar in his quest to
unify the region nearly two centuries ago.
V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN THE
AMERICAS
A. Early Integration Efforts
The efforts of Sim6n Bolivar in the early 1800s were among
the first attempts to integrate the Americas.' However, "as
Latin America's 'Liberator' lay dying... he mourned his dream
for 'the Americas,' a land whose future he feared would be dim
and precarious unless he could forge a single republic from its
stubborn mosaic."3' More than 150 years later, Bolivar is re-
garded as one of Latin America's great heroes, but the six coun-
tries that consider him their founding father have developed
distinct identities. Bolivar's inability to unify the Americas has
been followed by other unsuccessful attempts to achieve similar
goals.
B. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1960)
In 1960, seven Latin American countries signed the Monte-
video Treaty establishing the Latin American Free Trade Associ-
ation (LAFTA).35 The LAFTA members planned to reduce tar-
33. At the NAFTA signing ceremony, held at the Washington, D.C. headquar-
ters of the Organization of American States on December 17, 1992, President Bush
acknowledged the efforts of Sim6n Bolivar: "Sim6n Bolivar, the Liberator whose
statue stands outside this hall, spoke about an America united in heart, subject to
one law and guided by the torch of liberty. My friends, here in this hemisphere we
are on the way to realizing Sim6n Bolivar's dream. And, today, with the signing of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, we take another step toward making
the dream a reality." Signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 1993. See generally GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, THE GENERAL
IN His LABYRINTH (Edith Grossman trans., 1990) (a novel based on Bolivar's quest
and his ultimate failure to unify South America).
34. Marie Arana-Ward, A Turn in the South, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993, (Book
World), at X5 (reviewing PETER WINN, THE CHANGING FACE OF LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (1993)).
35. Montevideo Treaty, Instrument Establishing the Latin American Free Trade
Association, Feb. 18, 1960. Originally, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay formed the LAFTA. Later, they were joined by Colombia and
[Vol. 27:1118
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iffs on the goods of contracting states annually until 1972, at
which time tariffs on goods traded among member states were to
be eliminated.8 The LAFTA was intended to lead to a Latin
American Common Market, but it failed to achieve even its less
ambitious goals of gradual trade liberalization and a regional
economic integration program. LAFTA's lack of success prompt-
ed a reassessment which resulted in a new initiative in 1980.
C. Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, 1980)
In 1980, a new Montevideo Treaty replaced the LAFTA with
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).37 The LAIA
differs from the LAFTA in that the earlier treaty established a
goal to achieve economic integration within twelve years. Al-
though the LAIA maintains the ultimate goal of the formation of
a Latin American Common Market, the agreement does not
include a deadline for this achievement.3" The 1980 Treaty es-
tablished a framework for negotiating bilateral trade accords
that could be progressively multilateralized."9 Thus, the LAIA
Ecuador.
36. Id.
37. Montevideo Treaty, Instrument Establishing the Latin American Integration
Association, Aug. 12, 1980. The eleven Latin American member states are Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. There are four observer organizations: the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
the Organization of American States (OAS), and the European Community (EC).
38. Id. arts. I & III(b).
39. Each of the several accords negotiated under the Latin American Integra-
tion Association (LAIA) framework adheres to a single origin regime, which is em-
bodied in Resolution 78, adopted by the LAIA Committee of Representatives in 1987.
Establecimiento del Regimen General de Origen, Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de
Integraci6n ALADI/CR/Res. 78, Nov. 24, 1987. The Chile-Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment provides a sample of the language used in the individual agreements negoti-
ated under the LAIA framework:
The signatory countries shall apply to the imports sold under the protec-
tion of the Liberalization Program of the present Agreement, the General
Origin Regime of the ALADI, established by Resolution 78 of the Com-
mittee of Representatives of the Association, unimpaired by the specific
requirements fixed by the Administrative Commission referred to in Arti-
cle 34 of the present Agreement.
Economic Complementation Agreement between Chile and Mexico, done Sept. 21,
1991, art. 10 (trans. by author). Each of the other agreements formed under the
LAIA share similar language establishing Resolution 78 as their basic origin regime.
See, e.g., Acuerdo de Complementaci6n para el Establecimiento de un Espacio
Econ6mico Ampliado entre Chile y Ecuador, done in Quito, Ecuador, December 20,
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
embraced more realistic expectations than those embodied in the
LAFTA. Although the LAFTA was unsuccessful and the LAIA
has yet to achieve its goal of a common market, national leaders
continue to strive for integration. Recent efforts, including some
initiated by the United States, hold greater promise than those
of the past.
D. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI, 1990)
On June 27, 1990, President George Bush announced the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative."° The Bush
Administration's ultimate objective for the Initiative was the
execution of a framework agreement that would lead to
hemispheric free trade.4' As a first step, the Bush program
sought to increase capital flow to those Latin American coun-
tries that were willing to liberalize their trade and investment
regimes. Debt reduction was another element.42 The Initiative
delineated a list of preconditions which were labeled "indicators
of readiness" for a formal free trade agreement with the United
States: (1) the economic and institutional capacity to fulfill long-
term, serious commitments; (2) a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment and market-oriented policies; (3) progress in achieving
open trade regimes; and (4) membership in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.' These preconditions laid the foun-
dation for yet another regional integration endeavor.
E. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,
1994)
Upon completion of the NAFTA negotiations on August 12,
1992, the Bush Administration claimed to have created the
"largest market in the world, with 360 million consumers and $6
trillion in annual output."" Indeed, the NAFTA "is the most
1994, art. 7.
40. United States: Remarks on the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, June
27, 1990 and September 14, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1566 (1990).
41. Id. at 1567.
42. Id.
43. Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Areas, the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative, and the Multilateral Trading System, in STRATEGIC OPTIONS
FOR LATIN AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 250-60 (Colin Bradford ed., 1990).
44. U.S. Dep't Comm., The North American Free Trade Agreement: America's
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comprehensive free trade pact (short of a common market) ever
negotiated between regional trading partners ... ."5 The ac-
cord is unprecedented not only in terms of its size and compre-
hensiveness, but also in that it establishes free trade between
two developed countries, Canada and the U.S., and a developing
country, Mexico.' The trilateral accord requires Mexico to im-
plement a level of trade and investment liberalization equal to
that already agreed to by Canada and the United States in their
bilateral accord of 1988."7 Thus, the NAFTA includes many of
the provisions of the Canada-U.S. FTA.
NAFTA implementation began on January 1, 1994 and
within ten years will eliminate tariff and most non-tariff barri-
ers to regional trade.' Implementation is not free of complica-
tions. The rules of origin created problems due to their complexi-
ty. In fact, trade slowed as a result of the obstacles presented by
the rules of origin.49 Thus, while in some areas the NAFTA rep-
resents a new, improved and expanded version of the Canada-
U.S. FTA,5° the Agreement's problems must be resolved if its
expansion is to become an effective vehicle for the establishment
of the FTAA.51
Competitive Future, BUS. AM., Oct. 19, 1992, at 2.
45. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 21, at 1. For a brief comparison of the
NAFTA and the European Economic Community, see supra note 29.
46. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE:
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1992). NAFTA is also one of only three post-war
period trilateral regional free trade agreements. The first agreement was between
the BENELUX countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), which was
consumed by the formation of the European Economic Community. Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania established the other trilateral FTA in 1967; the East African Com-
munity (EAC) failed by 1977. Id. at 23 n.1.
47. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 21, at 2 (discussing the similarity of
the bilateral Canada-U.S. FTA of 1988 and the trilateral NAFTA of 1992).
48. See NAFTA, supra note 20.
49. See NAFTA Accession, supra note 28. See also Ken Cottrill, Short-term Pain
for Long Term Gain; Rules of Origin Regulations; NAFTA/GATT, Global Trade &
Transportation, June 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File, ISSN:
1069-2843.
50. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 21, at 2.
51. For a brief discussion of using the NAFTA as a building block in the cre-
ation of the FTAA, see supra note 28.
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F. The Summit of the Americas and Chile's Accession to the
NAFTA
In December 1993, Vice President Al Gore affirmed the
Clinton Administration's commitment to U.S. plans for hemi-
spheric integration that President Bush originally initiated with
the EA. During a trip to Mexico, Vice President Gore proposed
a meeting of all the leaders of the Western Hemisphere.52 A few
months later, the Clinton Administration confirmed its plan to
establish a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Zone in ten to fif-
teen years. The Administration also announced that it would
initiate the new integration process by negotiating Chile's acces-
sion' to the NAFTA." Subsequently, on December 9-10, 1994,
the leaders of the region's thirty-four democracies gathered at
the historic Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida.' The
leaders committed themselves to unite the various trade accords
within the region."M Currently, there are at least six regional
trade arrangements operative in the Americas.57 There are at
52. Tim Golden, Clinton Planning Hemisphere Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1993,
at A9.
53. In the words of U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, "[tihe reason
that we have worked closely with Chile is [that] the president elect of the United
States in December 1992 committed himself that if and when the NAFTA was ap-
proved by the Congress of the United States . . . Chile would be the first country
considered for accession . . . That has been a product of the very impressive eco-
nomic and political record in Chile over the last number of years. Let me just say,
in 1993 alone Chile had 10 percent growth and 4 percent unemployment and a
budget and trade surplus." Summit of the Americas: Press Conference with U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, supra note 2.
54. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Plans Expanded Trade Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1994, at D4.
55. NAFTA Invitation to Chile Caps Americas Summit in Miami, Latin Ameri-
can Regional Reports: Southern Cone, Dec. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Lan File [hereinafter NAFTA Invitation].
56. U.S. GOVT, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 3.
57. The Andean Pact consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Vene-
zuela. Chile was initially a party to the Andean Pact but left the accord in 1976.
The Central American Common Market (CACM) consists of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has
thirteen members including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St.
Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Antigua, the Bahamas,
Belize, Montserrat, and St. Kitts. The Group of Three includes Mexico, Venezuela,
and Colombia. Mercosur or El Mercado Comzin del Sur includes Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in-
cludes Canada, the United States and Mexico. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
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least twenty-five bilateral trade agreements. 8
The ultimate goal articulated by national leaders attending
the Summit is the establishment of an FTAA by the year 2005.
Under the Summit's Declaration of Principles, the countries
committed to "begin immediately" the construction of the free
trade area. It calls for building on existing bilateral and sub-
regional arrangements "in order to broaden and deepen hemi-
spheric economic integration."59 The trade component of the
Plan of Action accompanying the Declaration of Principles is
entitled Promoting Prosperity through Economic Integration and
Free Trade. It calls for analysis to "determine areas of common-
ality and divergence in the particular agreements under review
and the consideration of the means of bringing them togeth-
er. "6
The NAFTA members wasted no time in pursuing the objec-
tives established by the Declaration of Principles. Immediately
following the Summit, the leaders from the NAFTA countries
formally announced that preliminary discussions on Chile's
accession to the NAFTA would begin in January 1995; formal
negotiations would begin in June 1995.61 Since the signing of
the NAFTA, Chile's status in relation to the NAFTA indicates
the willingness of the U.S. to actively pursue an expansion of its
formal trading relationships. 2 Chile's successful accession to
the NAFTA is important as it is the initial step toward hemi-
spheric integration since the Summit.' As part of the accession
SCHOTr, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 219-49, app. C (1994).
According to Peter Smith, under "conventional usage, 'regional' agreements
involve three or more countries; bilateral accords do not qualify." Peter Smith, The
Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 13 n.4 (Peter Smith ed., 1993).
58. After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes The Hard Part, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 3 (Jan. 18, 1995), at 129, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
59. U.S. GOV'T, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 3.
60. Id.
61. NAFTA Invitation, supra note 55.
62. President George Bush's remarks upon signing the NAFTA reflect an in-
tended course of action. The enlargement of the NAFTA is a step toward further
integration. "I hope and trust that the North American free trade area can be ex-
tended to Chile, other worthy partners in South America, and Central America and
the Caribbean. Free trade throughout the Americas is an idea whose time has
come." Signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 33.
63. According to Kent Foster and Dean Alexander, "since Chile is a relatively
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process, negotiators must formulate a workable set of origin
rules. These rules are critical to Chile's successful accession as
well as the creation of the FTAA.'
As noted above, the NAFTA negotiators used the enlarge-
ment of the existing Canada-U.S. FTA as an opportunity to
modify the rules of origin.65 Similarly, Chile's NAFTA accession
negotiations create a window of opportunity to discard, or build
upon, the current NAFTA rules of origin. Upon Chile's accession,
NAFTA negotiators should adopt a common external tariff for a
broad range of goods, in keeping with the precedent set by the
NAFTA rules of origin for computers.6 If the region's leaders
who attended the Summit of the Americas capitalize on this
opportunity to extend the computer rule to cover other goods,
then subsequent NAFTA accessions will be made easier and
hemispheric integration (this time in the form of the FTAA) is
likely to succeed.
VI. INTEGRATION: THE CHALLENGE POSED BY ORIGIN
DETERMINATIONS
There is much work to be done following the signing cere-
monies, declarations of intent, and euphoria associated with the
announcement of integration initiatives. The record of integra-
tion in the Americas cautions against high expectations. Past
implementation efforts have been disrupted by a political tug-of-
small market for U.S. products and services, the overall economic impact . .. on the
U.S. will probably be minimal. Yet, the political ramifications would be rather sub-
stantial: namely, the U.S. would take another step towards creating a unified eco-
nomic bastion in the Western Hemisphere." KENT S. FOSTER & DEAN C. ALEXANDER,
PROSPECTS OF A U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 101 (1994).
64. See MICHAEL HART, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA 104 (1990) (identifying the rules of origin as
"the most difficult and the most important chapter that will have to be tackled in
negotiating Mexican accession" to the NAFTA). See also Designadas 4 Comisiones
para Tratar Entrada de Chile al NAFTA, EL MERCURIO (Santiago), July 4, 1995, at
Al, A12 (identifying one of four Chilean negotiating teams as responsible for the
rules of origin issue).
65. For a discussion of policy-maker's perceptions that the NAFTA presented an
opportunity to improve the FTA rules of origin, see supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
66. NAFTA, supra note 20, vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 308 & Annex 308.1, Most-
Favored-Nation Rates of Duty on Certain Automatic Data Processing Goods and
Their Parts.
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war. Technical difficulties, like rules of origin, pose additional
obstacles that disfavor successful integration.
Although the implementation of a trade agreement is not an
easy task, national governments in the region now have the
opportunity to capitalize on a complex set of factors which favor
integration. Governments throughout Latin America have re-
stored democracy and turned to liberal, market-oriented econom-
ic models. 7 Thus, the presence of ideological disharmony and
competing economic models no longer present the obstacles that
they have in the past." These new circumstances allow for the
establishment of liberalizing trade arrangements such as the
NAFTA.6 These achievements are the result of a complex pro-
cess. One indication of the complexity involved in the implemen-
tation of free trade is the level of detail in the text of the trade
agreements and their implementing legislation. For example, the
NAFTA is comprised of more than 2,000 pages of dense legal
text.7" The annex to the chapter on the rules of origin spans
169 pages.7'
A. Rules of Origin
Although rules of origin are only one of the difficulties con-
fronting the implementation of free trade accords, they pose one
of the primary obstacles.7" If the rules of origin are overly com-
67. See generally Riordan Roett, Why Integration Now? U.S. Interests and Pur-
poses, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 93, 97-99
(Peter H. Smith ed., 1993).
68. Craig Van Grasstek & Gustavo Vega, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: A Regional Model?, in THE PREMISE AND THE PROMISE: FREE TRADE IN
THE AMERICAS 157, 159 (Sylvia Saborio ed., 1992).
69. Once Mexico's market-oriented economic transformation was well underway,
former Mexican President Salinas proposed to George Bush an FTA between the
U.S. and Mexico. See, e.g., Robert A. Pastor, The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment: Hemispheric and Geopolitical Implications, in TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 53 (IADB, Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, 1995).
70. See generally NAFTA, supra note 20; U.S., Mexico, Canada Agree to Form
Huge Common Market, L.A. TIMES, August 13, 1994, at Al, A7.
71. See NAFTA, supra note 20, at vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 4, Annex 401.
72. According to Ann Hughes, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce for the
Western Hemisphere, the NAFTA rules are complex. When she was asked about
problems encountered with NAFTA implementation, Hughes reported that problems
of interpretation of the rules of origin created backlogs on both sides of the border.
NAFTA Accession, supra note 28, at 2. See also supra notes 4, 23, and 64 for other
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plex, then businesses engaged in international trade will not
deem the benefits of preferential tariff treatment worth the cost
of compliance. The result is the negation of the carefully negoti-
ated effects originally intended by the signatories of the agree-
ment. For example, under the Canada-U.S. FTA, many firms
discovered that the advantage of duty-free tariff treatment was
not worth the cost of compliance with the FTA origin rules.73
Fortunately, NAFTA negotiators and drafters recognized the
difficulties that the rules of origin pose. As such, when the nine-
teen NAFTA negotiating groups were formed, included among
them was a negotiating group that would focus its full attention
on the rules of origin.74 At the Summit of the Americas, the
leaders from each of the NAFTA signatories and Chile agreed to
establish five special committees to look into Chile's prepared-
ness for accession. Among the issues to be examined are the
rules of origin.75 The actual negotiation of Chile's accession to
the NAFTA will involve an origin rule focus group like the one
relied upon during the NAFTA negotiations.76 Any successful
enlargement of the NAFTA is, at least in part, dependent on the
rules of origin issue.
1. Various Types of Origin Rules Defined
Rules of origin are those laws, regulations, and administra-
tive practices that are applied to ascribe a country of origin to
goods in international trade.7 Many trade regulations, like
references identifying rules of origin as a primary obstacle to free trade implementa-
tion.
73. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-CANADA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 28-31 (GAO/GGD-93-21, 1992). See also Joseph A. LaNasa,
Rules of Origin under the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Substantial
Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381,
391 (1993).
74. HUFBAUER & SCHOrr, supra note 46, at 25, tbl. 2.1 (1993) (listing the nine-
teen negotiating areas under six broad categories). Negotiators and drafters included
provisions for limited review of some of the rules of origin after the NAFTA was
implemented. For example, the Agreement calls for a review of the rules of origin
for textiles and apparel before Jan. 1, 1988. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 21, at
44 n.17 (1993). The NAFTA, however, does not provide for a regular review and
revision of the general rules of origin. Id. at 135.
75. See NAFTA Invitation, supra note 55, at 1.
76. See generally FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 63, at 43-46.
77. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDIZATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN, 1987:
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preferential tariff treatment, are applicable on a country-by-
country basis. Therefore, it is necessary to identify one and only
one country of origin for each import, even if more than one
country was involved in the production of the imported good.
Rules of origin enable the trading community to distinguish
those goods to which a particular regulation applies and those to
which the regulation does not apply. They are the free trade
implementation mechanism, but they serve other purposes as
well.
a. Non-preferential Rules of Origin
Non-preferential rules are one type of origin rule. They have
several purposes. For example, under U.S. law, every import
must be marked with the name of its country of origin.7" Non-
preferential rules include those that determine origin for mark-
ing and statistical purposes. Non-preferential rules also deter-
mine most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).79 Under the
MFN clause of the GATT, non-preferential origin rules are pri-
marily rules to determine preferential eligibility for reduced
tariffs." However, because MFN treatment is available to most
nations, the rules that determine which goods receive MFN
tariff rates are considered non-preferential rules. In theory, if
every country were to apply MFN treatment to imports, the
origin of products would not be particularly important because
there would be no need for any country to differentiate among
its imports.8 ' This, however, is not the case. Consequently, pref-
REPORT TO THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. 1976), May 1987, at 1.
78. Under the Tariff Act of 1930, every import must be "marked in .. . such a
manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the English
name of the country of origin of the article." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304.
79. GATT, supra note 27, art. I.
80. Under the terms of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States,
different MFN rates of duty are applied based on the country of origin of each im-
ported product. 19 U.S.C. § 1202.
81. See Jacques Bourgeois, Rules of Origin: An Introduction, in RULES OF ORI-
GIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (Edwin Vermulst et al. eds.,
1994). Note that the theory stated here becomes a reality, on a regional level, upon
the imposition of a common external tariff (CET). No differentiation is necessary
among the goods traded between countries that are party to a trade accord with a
CET. Correspondingly, origin determinations and the cumbersome rules that govern
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erential rules of origin play a major role in the international
trading system.
b. Preferential Rules of Origin
Preferential rules govern the origin determinations of goods
traded among members of an FTA, or preferential trading re-
gime. Most importantly, they allow the advantages of a free
trade area to accrue principally to the contracting parties.
s2
Two examples of preferential rules of origin are those rules
embodied in the U.S. General System of Preferences (GSP) a
and those incorporated in the NAFTA. The origin rules of the
GSP limit preferential treatment to the products of designated
beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) by minimizing the pos-
sibility for developed countries to operate pass-through opera-
tions in the BDCs in a surreptitious attempt to gain preferential
tariff treatment." Under the NAFTA, tariffs are eliminated
only on goods that "originate" in the NAFTA territory, as defined
by Article 401 of the Agreement. 5 The rules embodied in Arti-
cle 401 allow the trading community to establish which goods
originate in the NAFTA territory and preclude traders from non-
NAFTA countries from gaining preferential tariff treatment by
merely shipping their goods through Mexico on their way to the
U.S. or Canada, or vice versa."
them become largely unnecessary for those goods shipped from one member state to
another.
82. According to Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin, rules of origin are needed to
"ensure that the free-trade benefits of a NAFTA accrue to North American products
and their workers." Testimony of Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin, 1992: Hearing
before the Comm. on Finance of the U.S. Senate, Sept. 10, 1992 at 5, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Fedreg file.
83. Since 1974, the General System of Preferences has operated to facilitate the
development of investment in lesser developed countries and the export of manufac-
tures from those countries. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V, 88
Stat. 1978, 2066-71 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2461-2466).
84. A product is eligible for beneficiary developing country (BDC) duty-free
treatment if it is wholly made in a BDC. Or a product may qualify if it meets other
statutorily controlled guidelines. Namely, the product is "originating" if the total of
(1) the cost or value of materials produced in a BDC, and (2) the direct costs of pro-
cessing operations performed therein is not less than thirty-five percent of the
article's appraised value upon entry to the United States. Id. at §§ 2461-2466.
85. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 401. For a discussion of the NAFTA rules of
origin, see infra notes 158-187 and accompanying text.
86. Id. The U.S. concern over transshipment, or the creation of a "beachhead"
or "export platform" significantly impacted the formulation of the origin rules. See
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B. Obstacles to the Implementation of Free Trade
There are at least twenty-three preferential regional trading
arrangements world-wide.87 These arrangements include 119
countries and account for eighty-two percent of the world's inter-
national trade in goods.88 Each of the six major regional accords
in the Americas89 has its own origin code. The complexity of the
rules of origin in each of these arrangements presents obstacles
to free trade. Moreover, the trading community faces serious
challenges in understanding and complying with such a wide
variety of rules. The fact that there are six separate trade ar-
rangements, all of which share the common goal of trade liberal-
ization, has complicated trade. Convergence of the various re-
gional accords will be required to form the FTAA, and the estab-
lishment of a common origin rule will be a critical component of
that process.
1. The Lack of Uniformity
At present, there is no uniform legal principle that governs
origin determinations internationally. This results in increased
costs and delays for those involved in international trade, as
well as higher prices for consumers.9" The NAFTA holds prom-
ise for the hope of uniformity. Under Article 511 of the Agree-
ment, each of the parties must formulate uniform regulations for
use in, inter alia, making country of origin determinations.9
Thus, expansion of the NAFTA is an appealing vehicle for the
creation of the FTAA. As countries accede to the NAFTA, Article
infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
87. Norman S. Fieleke, One Trading World, or Many: The Issue of Regional
Trading Blocs, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., May-June 1992, at 3.
88. Id.
89. Although the Western Hemisphere has over twenty diverse trade arrange-
ments, its major accords are the NAFTA, the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Group of Three. See, e.g., Special Re-
port: Trade Outlook for 1995, supra note 57, at 129. For a list of the members to
each of the six major trade accords in the Americas, see supra note 58.
90. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDIZATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN, supra
note 77, at 1.




511 would compel harmonization of the origin regimes that are
used in the Western Hemisphere. The recognition of a uniform
origin rule would not only facilitate trade in the Americas, but
also would make the negotiation of an FTAA easier because each
of the thirty-four potential signatories would have settled expec-
tations regarding the origin rules for the FTAA.92
2. The Growing Problem of Determining Country of Origin
The question of where a good originates was once a relative-
ly minor concern because the volume of international trade was
comparatively low and preferential trade arrangements were not
as common. Today, the question poses a significant problem.
Origin determinations are becoming increasingly important for
at least three reasons: (1) increasing levels of international trade
and the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements; (2)
the growing use of multiple country manufacturing processes by
many enterprises; and (3) the need for signatories to an FTA to
prevent free-riders from exploiting the reductions in trade barri-
ers bargained for by the contracting states. 3 Correspondingly,
the rules that govern origin determinations are becoming in-
creasingly complex.
a. Increased Trade and the Proliferation of Preferential
Trade Arrangements
Rules of origin have become increasingly important as the
volume of global trade expands. Trade has grown quickly be-
tween the U.S. and its regional trading partners. From 1989 to
1992, for example, U.S. exports to Mexico increased by sixty-two
percent and U.S. imports from Mexico increased by twenty-nine
percent.9 Theoretically, each good that crosses the U.S. border
must undergo a country of origin determination and traders
must prepare the necessary documentation for that purpose.
Even more burdensome is the fact that, under the NAFTA, re-
92. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDIZATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN, su-
pra note 77, at 24.
93. Id. at 3.
94. LENORE SEK, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF (The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) Jan. 5, 1994, at 2.
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cords related to origin claims must be kept for five years."
Computers and related goods traded among NAFTA members,
however, are exceptions to this otherwise universal rule.96
In addition to the effects of growing trade volume, preferen-
tial origin rules become increasingly important with the prolifer-
ation of preferential trading arrangements.97 Trade liberaliza-
tion results in increasingly competitive markets and makes
preferential tariff treatment critical for firms engaged in inter-
national trade. As a result of increased competition, businesses
must concern themselves with origin requirements if they are to
gain the advantage of preferential tariff treatment. Also, cus-
toms officials must rely more heavily on origin determinations
for regulatory purposes as trade expands and governments con-
tinue to form trade accords.
b. Multiple Country Manufacturing
Other factors make origin determinations increasingly im-
portant. Thirty-years ago, goods traded internationally were
often produced in only one country. 8 Consequently, origin de-
terminations were not a significant trade-related problem. The
creation of a workable origin code governing goods wholly ob-
95. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 505.
96. "Common market" treatment for computers will be significant for the in-
dustry and consumers alike, particularly given the size of the computer market in
North America. Mexico and Canada constitute a U.S. $6.2 billion market for U.S.
computer hardware manufacturers. U.S. DEP'T COMM., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. INDUSTRIES, COMPUTER AND SOFrWARE INDUS-
TRIES 1 (1993). During 1992, Mexico purchased U.S. $970 million worth of U.S.
hardware. U.S. firms enjoyed twenty percent annual growth in the Mexican hard-
ware market. The computer hardware industry in the U.S. is also a major employer
with 290,000 employees in 1988, declining to 227,000 in 1991. Id. The gains in effi-
ciency upon implementation of the computer rule common market treatment will
result in substantial cost savings for producers and similar savings for consumers in
North America; Mexico must reduce its tariffs on computers (currently 20%) to the
level of those imposed by the U.S. (3.9%). As such, the reduction in tariffs is likely
to result in a corresponding decrease in the price of any U.S. computers sold in
Mexico. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Putting NAFTA to Use: Duty Reductions for
Computer Hardware and Software, 2 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 4 (1994).
97. See David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in a Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Agreement, in TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 191, 202 (IADB,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995).
98. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDIZATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN, su-
pra note 77, at 2.
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tained or produced in the territory of the contracting parties did
not present severe difficulties. However, the practice of multiple
country manufacturing has grown substantially." Today, the
manufacture of automobiles and like products incorporates many
components and sub-components that frequently are produced or
assembled in several countries."° The Honda case demon-
strates that the problem of origin determinations is particularly
onerous in those instances where a product consists of compo-
nent parts from several different countries. 1 Various ap-
proaches have been employed to govern origin determinations of
such products, but none have been identified as a workable
universal solution.
c. Free-riders and Transshipment
Critics of the NAFTA argued that it would create a "beach-
head" in Mexico for manufacturing firms from Asia and other
countries. The outcome of the negotiations reflected this con-
cern.' 2 At the urging of the U.S., the NAFTA signatories insti-
tuted strict rules of origin. They were designed to prevent the
development of an "export platform" that would allow Japan,
Brazil, or other countries to gain tariff-free entry into the North
American market.0 3 Without these strict rules, the U.S. ar-
gued, non-contracting states might avoid U.S. trade barriers and
enjoy the preferential rates bargained for by Canada and Mexi-
co. Thus, the rules limit the possibility for traders from non-con-
tracting states from using transshipment or superficial process-
ing techniques to cloak non-originating goods as goods of NAFTA
origin. Regardless, this practice remains a concern." Non-con-
tracting states seek to pass their goods through the territory of
the contracting state with the lowest external trade barriers
prior to shipping them to their final destination in order to ob-
99. Id. at 26.
100. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 376.
101. The description of the Honda case provides an example of multiple country
manufacturing by Honda Motor Company. The Civic engines were built in Ohio
using Japanese and U.S. parts. The engines then were used in the assembly of the
Civics before the finished automobiles were shipped to the U.S. for final sale. See
supra Part II.
102. See HUFBAUER & SCHOIr, supra note 21, at 37.
103. See HART, supra note 64, at 37-38.
104. See Testimony of Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin, supra note 82.
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tain preferential access to other markets in the NAFTA territo-
ry. 
105
A "screwdriver" plant is the term used to describe a facility
where a company from a non-contracting state employs insignifi-
cant manufacturing processes in an attempt to impart bogus
originating status to their goods before them shipping to the
final destination within the FTA. Origin rules enable contracting
states to prevent companies from non-contracting states from
using such activities as a means of obtaining the preferential
treatment bargained for by FTA members." s One specific ex-
ample is Article 412 of the NAFTA which provides that goods di-
luted with water or another substance shall not be considered
originating."° In other words, dilution does not confer origin,
even if dilution produces a change in tariff heading. Although
Article 412 and other provisions like it limit transshipment and
free riders, they add complexity to the rules of origin and make
further documentation necessary to demonstrate compliance.
VII. THE CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION
The global trading community has not established an ac-
cepted international standard for origin determinations for goods
manufactured in more than one country, despite the fact that
intra-agreement trade between members of preferential trade
accords accounts for more than four-fifths of the total volume of
world trade.' The benefits of standardization are substantial.
They include facilitating business planning, reducing the oppor-
tunity for trade deflection, allowing for the compilation of coun-
try specific trade data, and avoiding the proliferation of multiple
standards."° A universal standard would also minimize bur-
105. The imposition of a CET eliminates the advantages of transshipment be-
cause the tariff rate encountered upon entry into the territory covered by the trade
agreement is the same regardless of the country of entry. For example, computers
eventually will confront a 3.9% tariff when imported into the NAFTA territory re-
gardless of whether the point of entry is located in Canada, Mexico, or the United
States. See infra part VIII.B.4 for further discussion of the tariff treatment of com-
puters under the NAFTA.
106. See generally NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 401 (outlining the rules of origin).
107. Id. art. 412.
108. See Fieleke, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDIZATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN, supra
note 77, at 2.
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densome administrative costs and simplify compliance with
origin rule requirements." 0 Although there have been several
attempts to achieve standardization, the various origin rules re-
main complex and confusing.
The Honda case created tension between Canada and the
United States because there was no mechanism for achieving
uniformity in the interpretation of the rules of origin under the
FTA. It provides one example of the need for a universal set of
rules governing country of origin determinations and a uniform
interpretation of those rules. The FTAA can only function effec-
tively once a workable standard is in place. Yet, standardization
has not been achieved despite the attempts highlighted below.
An altogether new approach to origin determinations is neces-
sary.
A. The Kyoto Convention (July, 1974)
On December 15, 1950, the signing of the Brussels Conven-
tion created the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC). The CCC
is a technical organization that assists its members with cus-
toms issues."' It has attempted to standardize the national
customs provisions of its 111 members. As part of the CCC's
work, it has organized several conventions, including the Inter-
national Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of
Customs Procedures, better known as the Kyoto Conven-
tion." Annex D.1 to the Kyoto Convention concerns all
rules of origin, both preferential and non-preferential." It
provides that when a good is produced in more than one country,
it is an originating good of the country where its "substantial
110. For one testimonial highlighting the problem created by lack of harmoni-
zation, see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
111. Edurne Navarro Varona, Rules of Origin in the GATT, in RULES OF ORIGIN
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATivE STUDY 355, 359 (Edwin Vermulst et al.
eds., 1994).
112. International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Cus-
toms Procedures, May 18, 1973 (entered into force Sept. 25, 1974) [hereinafter The
Kyoto Convention].
113. International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Cus-
toms Procedures, Message from the President of the United States transmitting the
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Proce-
dures (entered into force Sept. 25, 1994), with Annexes and Reservations to those
Annexes, S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-23, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1982) [hereinafter An-
nex D.1 to The Kyoto Convention].
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transformation" occurs."' The Annex defines substantial
transformation as the process that gives the product its "essen-
tial character."" 5 The European Community and most indus-
trial countries accepted the Convention's framework." 6 Howev-
er, the Convention lacks product specific rules and provides only
general, non-compulsory principles to guide origin determina-
tion."7 Furthermore, the U.S. only partially ratified the Kyoto
Convention.1 Thus, although the U.S. does rely on the con-
cept of substantial transformation for its general rule of ori-
gin,1 it does not subscribe to the specifics of Annex D.1.
B. The United States International Trade Commission
Report (May, 1987)
In September of 1986, the Chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives requested
that the U.S. International Trade Commission investigate the
possibility of developing a standard U.S. and international rule
of origin. 2 ' The report generated in response summarized and
evaluated three principal rules in use: (1) the last substantial
transformation test; (2) the change of tariff heading test; and (3)
the value added test. 2' The report identified the flaws inher-
ent in each of the three rules and established four criteria to
evaluate any new rules of origin: (1) uniformity; (2) simplicity;
(3) predictability; and (4) administrability.22 In conclusion, the
report recommended the adoption of a new standard based on
processing requirements." 3
The recommended process-based approach would confer
origin on the last country where one of a list of enumerated
processes occurred. It would require that a product undergo a
sufficiently significant process before origin would be conferred.
114. Id. See also HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 46, at 156.
115. Annex D.1 to The Kyoto Convention, supra note 113.
116. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 46, at 157.
117. See Palmeter, supra note 10, at 201.
118. Navarro Varona, supra note 111, at 360.
119. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. United States, 207 U.S. 556 (1907).
120. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMN, STANDARDIZATION OF RULEs OF ORIGIN, supra
note 77, at (i).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 30-32.
123. Id. at 46-47.
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This approach has not been pursued in subsequent efforts to
standardize the rules of origin because it is contingent upon an
unlikely event. Namely, the approach would require the creation
of a coding system for manufacturing processes similar to the
Harmonized Tariff System12 (HTS). The HTS classifies prod-
ucts based on their similarities. The creation of lists of enumer-
ated manufacturing processes on the order of the HTS is unlike-
ly to occur. As such, the process-based approach will not lead to
harmonization.
C. GATT Agreement on the Rules of Origin (April, 1994)
Until 1994, the Kyoto Convention's substantial transforma-
tion test was the closest approximation to an international stan-
dard. The problem was that it left many significant decisions to
the discretion of national authorities.' As a result, the origin
rule problem was included in the Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiations, in the framework of the Negotiating Group on Non-
Tariff Measures. 26 The primary purpose of doing so was to
harmonize existing national rules of origin and establish an
international standard.12 However, Article I:l of the GATT
Agreement on Rules of Origin establishes that the agreement
does not apply to "contractual or autonomous trade regimes
leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the
application of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994."" In other words,
the Agreement does not apply to preferential rules of origin.
While the U.S. proposed to extend harmonization to all rules of
origin, many other countries sought to restrict the discussions to
non-preferential rules of origin."' As the language of Article
124. International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, done June 14, 1983 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter
HTS]. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3012 (1988) (adopted as tit. I, §§ 1201-1212, Omnibus
Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1147). For the
U.S. schedule, see U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. No. 2449, Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States.
125. HUFBAUER & SCHOT, supra note 46, at 165.
126. Navarro Varona, supra note 111, at 363.
127. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, § II-11, art. 1 [hereinafter
GATT Origin Agreement].
128. Id. art. I:1.
129. See generally Navarro Varona, supra note 111, at 364 (discussing various
proposals regarding the scope of harmonization efforts under the GATT).
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I:1 indicates, the U.S. proposal was not accepted and the GATT
Agreement excludes all origin rules embodied in FTAs like the
NAFTA.
D. The Common Declaration with Regard to Preferential
Rules of Origin (April, 1994)
Although the U.S. position on standardization was not
adopted, Annex II to the GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin
indicates the international recognition of the need for advance-
ment in the area of preferential rules of origin. The Common
Declaration with Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin, embod-
ied in Annex II, results in a compromise. It does not harmonize
all preferential rules of origin, but it does extend some of the
guidelines for non-preferential rules to preferential rules. For
example, both the Agreement and the Annex call for clarity and
specificity in the design and application of rules of origin.13
Member states also ensure that any administrative origin deter-
minations are reviewable by judicial, arbitral, or administrative
tribunals or procedures.13
The GATT harmonization program, like the Kyoto Conven-
tion, uses the substantial transformation test as its basic rule.
Under the GATT Agreement, when a good is the product of
multiple country manufacturing processes, the country of origin
is the country "where the last substantial transformation has
been carried out."132 Both the U.S." 3 and the European Com-
munity 34 incorporate this test into their approach to origin de-
terminations in some form. The widespread use of the "substan-
tial transformation" formula gives the appearance that it is an
130. GAIT Origin Agreement, supra note 127, Annex II, art. 3(a). (Annex II to
the Agreement on Rules of Origin embodies the "Common Declaration with Regard
to Preferential Rules of Origin").
131. Id. Annex II, art. 3(f).
132. Id. pt. IV, art. 9(1)(b).
133. According to David Palmeter, the substantial transformation test is a judge-
made rule, nowhere defined by statutory law. Palmeter, supra note 10, at 35. A
good has undergone substantial transformation when a new and different article
with a distinctive name, character, or use emerges from the manufacturing process.
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. United States, 207 U.S. 556 (1907) (extending the
substantial transformation standard to U.S. rules of origin law).




accepted universal standard. However, the Kyoto Convention did
not refer to the last substantial transformation, but merely sub-
stantial transformation.135 Furthermore, the means by which
the U.S. and the EC determine substantial transformations dif-
fer.16 Because the substantial transformation approach to har-
monization is vague and requires subjective interpretations of
origin rules, it will not likely result in the desired harmoniza-
tion.
The Common Declaration with Regard to Preferential Rules
of Origin (Annex II to the GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin)
refers only to some of the universal principles established for
non-preferential rules, and their application is not compulsory
with regard to preferential rules. In the case of preferential
rules, additional requirements supplement the substantial trans-
formation test of the Agreement on non-preferential rules. For
example, specific value content rules must be satisfied in order
to confer origin on goods manufactured in more than one coun-
try. 1 37 Thus, preferential rules of origin remain disjointed and
complex, and the "substantial transformation" test is subject to
various interpretations despite the Common Declaration.
E. The World Trade Organization & The World Customs
Organization
In February 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
the World Customs Organization (WCO) initiated a joint effort
to standardize origin rules. According to the interim WTO Direc-
tor General Peter Sutherland, the cooperation of the 150-mem-
ber WCO is necessary in order to implement the new Uruguay
Round GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin. James W. Shaver,
Secretary General of the WCO, spoke of the advantages: "the
new rules of origin will have an "enormous" impact on interna-
tional trade, finance, investment, and employment."3  The
135. Annex D.1 to The Kyoto Convention, supra note 113.
136. Although both the U.S. and the European Community rely on substantial
transformation for their basic origin rule, the means by which substantial transfor-
mation is determined varies. See HUFBAUER & SCHOrr, supra note 46, at 163 (iden-
tifying the European Community's approach to origin determinations as involving
more discretion than the U.S. approach).
137. GATr Origin Agreement, supra note 128, Annex II.
138. WTO, Customs Group to Tackle Uniform Pact on Rules of Origin, J. COM.,
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three year work program, designed to formulate harmonized
rules of origin, will build new rules "from the ground up."139
The comprehensiveness of the joint WTO-WCO initiative
reflects the level of complexity confronted by the trading commu-
nity in dealing with the current origin rules. Despite this com-
prehensive plan, the implementation of the Uruguay Round
Origin Agreement will not facilitate the establishment of an
FTAA for at least two reasons. First, the WCO has a three year
time-line before it will even formulate the harmonized rules. As
a result, implementation of the rules will not occur until after
the NAFTA has confronted the challenges of enlargement. Sec-
ond, the application of the GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin
is not mandatory with regard to the origin rules of preferential
trading agreements like the NAFTA."'4 Although welcomed,
once implemented this new initiative will not simplify the real-
ization of the FTAA by 2005.
In sum, only Annex II to the GATT Agreement on Rules of
Origin has made any progress toward the harmonization of
preferential rules, and these advances are only marginal given
that compliance with the Common Declaration is voluntary. As a
result, the NAFTA signatories and FTAA negotiators must con-
centrate on alternatives rather than additional efforts to achieve
harmonization like those presented here, none of which hold
much promise for simplifying the creation of the FTAA.
VIII. THE OPERATION OF PREFERENTIAL ORIGIN REGIMES IN
NORTH AMERICA
The many unsuccessful efforts undertaken to harmonize
origin rules demonstrate the difficulty of formulating a workable
origin regime. Success with regard to preferential rules has been
even more limited than in the case of origin rules generally.
Particularly difficult is the formulation of rules for use in prefer-
ential trading arrangements to determine the origin of products
which undergo multiple country manufacturing processes.'
The Honda Civics discussed in Part II provide one example. The
Feb. 7, 1995, at A3.
139. Id.
140. GATT Origin Agreement, supra note 128, at Annex II.
141. See, e.g., Simpson Statement, supra note 24.
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analysis which follows focuses on the origin regimes of the Can-
ada-U.S. FTA and the NAFTA. Particular attention is paid to
the rules governing goods produced in multiple countries be-
cause they are the most problematic for the establishment of an
FTAA. The analysis also demonstrates why the NAFTA rule for
computers should be expanded upon and applied as a model in
the creation of an FTAA.
A. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
The window of opportunity created by the Canada-U.S.
FTA4 negotiation process enabled the U.S. to establish origin
rules distinct from those previously used." The FTA embodied
an approach that was unique to U.S. law in order to address the
issue of origin determinations for goods produced in more than
one country. Nonetheless, the Honda dispute demonstrates the
inadequacy of this innovation as a measure to resolve the funda-
mental problem. The following discussion elaborates on the
operation of the FTA rules and some of the difficulties they have
engendered.
1. The Operation of the FTA Rules of Origin
Under the FTA, there were two principal ways for goods to
satisfy the rules of origin requirements and become eligible for
tariff-free trade between the U.S. and Canada. First, a good was
admitted tariff free into Canada or the U.S. from the other coun-
try when it was "wholly obtained or produced in the territory of
either Party or both Parties."'" Second, the rules conferred ori-
gin if the good was "transformed in the territory of either Party
or both Parties so as to be subject to a change in tariff classifica-
tion."'" To satisfy the second rule, each of the good's non-origi-
nating components had to be transformed in either the U.S. or
Canada, and the transformation had to result in a change in
tariff heading. As was the case with the Honda Civics, some
142. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 6.
143. See Palmeter, supra note 10, at 66.
144. U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, § 202(aXl)(A), 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) [hereinafter FTA Implementation
Act].
145. Id. § 202(aX1XBXi).
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goods had to meet an additional minimum North American val-
ue content requirement to receive duty-free treatment."
a. The "New" Harmonized System Transformation Test
Under the FTA, substantial transformation was determined
according to the tariff classifications provided by the Harmo-
nized Commodity Description and Coding System, 147 or HTS.
The HTS classifies all goods into twenty-one sections and ninety-
six chapters. Each chapter is divided into headings with four-
digit codes, and further divided into subheadings with two addi-
tional digits. 4 In essence, the HTS provides a numerical code
for every good. Goods are grouped together based on their sim-
ilarities. The FTA chapter on origin rules was divided into sec-
tions corresponding to the HTS.
When a good containing non-originating components crossed
U.S. or Canadian borders, the origin rules of the chapter and
section applicable to that good were used to determine whether
the good had undergone sufficient processing in the U.S. or Can-
ada to qualify for a new tariff classification, different than the
classification given to its third-country components. If the good
qualified for the new classification, then it entered duty-free.
Because the HTS is organized so as to group similar goods
under the same headings and chapters, significant change is
said to have occurred when the processing of a good results in a
change from one heading or chapter to another. This method,
which relied on an HTS change of tariff heading to determine if
the good had undergone a substantial transformation, was new
to U.S. law. 49 The new system represented progress because
reliance on the HTS-based definition of "substantial transfor-
mation" minimized the ambiguities of the conventional substan-
tial transformation test.50 In this sense, the FTA origin rules
advanced U.S. trade law.
146. Id. §§ 202(a)(I)(B)(i)-(ii) & Annex 301.2.
147. HTS, supra note 124.
148. Id.
149. See Simpson Statement, supra note 24, at 36.
150. LaNasa, supra note 73, at 387.
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b. Regional Value Content Requirements
Although a change in tariff heading from one chapter to
another generally established that a good qualified for tariff-free
entry, a change from one heading or subheading to another
within a chapter did not always confer origin. In those instances,
the good did not automatically receive FTA preferential entry.
Rather, a second standard had to be met before many goods,
such as automobiles and automobile parts, received duty-free
entry. Specifically, goods subject to the value added requirement
had to be at least fifty-percent North American.'51 However,
some goods still received preferential treatment if they met the
fifty percent value content requirement regardless of tariff head-
ings.152 Thus, the value content requirement was applied in
combination with the change of tariff heading (CTH) test in
some instances and independently in others.
2. Some Problems with the FTA Rules of Origin
The application of both the CTH test to determine substan-
tial transformation sufficient to confer origin and the regional
value content requirement posed problems. The CTH tests did
not always function properly because the HTS was not designed
with a view to institute an origin regime." The HTS is orga-
nized according to the similarity of goods, not the significance of
manufacturing processes. While most assembly operations do
generate a CTH, the change is not always in fact significant. As
a result, negotiators believed that value content requirements
were necessary as a supplement to the CTH test. These regional
value content requirements resulted in creative interpretations
of what constituted regional value content when making origin
determinations.
151. FTA Implementation Act, supra note 144, §§ 202(aXIXB)(i)-(ii) & Annex
301.2.
152. Id. § 202(c)(3)(A).




Two of the problems associated with value content require-
ments are roll-up and roll-down. As noted in Part II, both of
these techniques came into play in the Honda dispute. Roll-up is
the process whereby non-originating goods are subsumed during
the manufacture of new and different goods (i.e., those which
have a different commercial identity according to the HTS
change of tariff heading test). When shipped across borders, the
new product is said to originate where the conversion occurred.
Thus, the costs of non-originating materials are rolled-up into
the value of the finished good.
Under some interpretations of the FTA, if a component with
non-originating inputs imported into the U.S. or Canada passed
the CTH test plus the fifty-percent value added test, it was
100% originating for the purposes of the regional value content
determination of the finished product. For example, Honda and
Revenue Canada claimed 100% originating status for the en-
gines incorporated into the Honda Civics. In fact, they contained
substantial non-originating materials. Honda rolled-up the value
of the non-originating (i.e., Japanese) sub-components of the
engines into the Civics when the automobiles were exported
from Canada for sale in the United States.
b. Roll-down
Alternatively, the FTA allowed for a component to be treat-
ed as non-originating merely because it included third country
parts. When such a component was incorporated into a finished
good, the component was sometimes treated as containing zero
percent originating goods, even though it actually contained sub-
stantial American or Canadian parts. This process is known as
roll-down and describes the reverse of the roll-up process. In
order to deny preferential treatment to a finished good that in-
corporated components with non-originating parts, customs offi-
cials, at their discretion, could roll-down the actual value of the
originating components incorporated into the finished good.
Recall that U.S. Customs employed this technique in the case of
the engines incorporated into the Civics in order to deny the
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finished automobiles originating status."5
Both roll-up and roll-down are instances where divergent
interpretations of the FTA origin rules resulted in the distortion
of regional value content calculations. These techniques impact-
ed North American trade of automobiles in particular because
the practice of multiple country manufacturing and assembly is
common to the automobile industry. The presentation of the
Honda dispute above illustrates the problems with the value
added element of the FTA rules."s Those problems were sup-
posed to be resolved by the NAFTA.
B. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The implementation of the NAFTA began almost two years
after the U.S. Customs Service and Revenue Canada issued
conflicting rulings in the Honda case.'56 The FTA rules of ori-
gin and the disputes that arose out of their application shaped
the NAFTA rules embodied in Article 401.1"7 The non-contro-
versial provisions of the FTA origin rules remain intact in the
NAFTA, but NAFTA negotiators redrafted areas that presented
problems, such as the value added requirements.
1. The Operation of the NAFTA Rules of Origin
NAFTA Article 401 defines originating goods in one of four
ways: (1) goods wholly obtained or produced in the NAFTA terri-
tory;"5 ' (2) goods produced within the NAFTA region wholly
from originating materials, i.e., produced from materials which
may contain non-NAFTA materials which satisfy the specific
rules of origin outlined in Annex 401 of the Agreement; (3) goods
produced in the NAFTA territory exclusively from inputs that
154. For a discussion of the incongruous U.S. Customs determination that the
engines were "originating" goods upon their initial shipment to Canada, see supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
155. See supra part II.
156. Customs Regulations Amendments Relating to the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement, 57 Fed. Reg. 2447 (1992) (revising 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.84,
10.303, 10.305, 10.307, 10.310).
157. See Simpson Statement, supra note 24.




are considered to be originating under the Agreement; and (4)
unassembled goods and goods classified with their parts which
do not meet the Annex 401 rule of origin but contain a specified
regional value content, '59 either fifty or sixty percent depend-
ing on the method of calculation."
The second and third options are potentially controversial
origin rule provisions. This is due to the complexity of establish-
ing that a good satisfies the general rule of origin or meets the
Annex 401 origin criteria. Article 401(b) indicates that goods
may originate in a signatory country, even if they contain non-
originating materials." 1 The Annex 401 rules, which govern
origin determinations for goods with third-country inputs, must
be satisfied in order for those goods to qualify for duty-free
treatment. The specific Annex 401 rules are based on a change
in tariff classification, a North American value-content require-
ment, or both.
2. Change of Tariff Classification
Like the origin rules in the FTA, the NAFTA organized its
rules according to the HTS. The extent of the tariff classification
change, or tariff shift, indicates whether sufficient North Ameri-
can processing has occurred to confer originating status. The
rule requires that each of the non-originating inputs used in the
manufacture of the beneficiary good shift its tariff classification
as a result of processes occurring entirely within NAFTA
territory."2 In other words, non-originating goods must be clas-
sified under one tariff heading prior to processing and then
classified under another upon completion of the processing.
Therefore, exporters must know the HTS classifications of both
the exported good and their non-North American components to
apply the origin rules. The specific rules of origin of Annex 401
describe the exact tariff shift that must occur before Customs
will treat goods as originating in North America and extend
them preferential treatment."
159. This provision is available only under two limited circumstances.
160. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 401.
161. Id. art. 401(b).
162. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A
GUIDE TO CUSTOMS PROCEDURES (Customs Pub. No. 571), May, 1994, at 3.
163. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 401 & Annex 401.
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An example of the application of the CTH test taken from
the NAFTA Guide to Customs Procedures illustrates the bur-
dens that the rules of origin impose on traders.
Frozen pork meat (HTS 02.03) is imported from Hungary and
mixed with spices from the Caribbean (HTS 09.07-09.10) and
cereals grown and produced in the U.S. to make pork sausage
(HTS 16.01). The Annex 401 rule of origin states:
A change in heading 16.01 through 16.05 from any other
chapter.
Since the imported frozen meat is classified in Chapter 2 and
the spices are classified in Chapter 9, these non-originating
inputs satisfy the required tariff shift. It is not necessary to
consider whether the cereal satisfies the applicable tariff
shift because it is originating in the U.S. and only non-origi-
nating inputs must undergo a tariff shift.1
When combined with cereals to produce pork sausage, the
imported meat and spices undergo sufficient processing so as to
allow the pork sausage "originating" status, despite the presence
of inputs from outside NAFTA territory. The pork sausage will
receive preferential tariff treatment when shipped to Mexico or
Canada from the United States because, in the production of the
sausage, the tariff heading of the non-originating inputs changes
in the manner required by the specific rule of Annex 401.
3. Regional Value Content Requirements
In addition to CTH tests, further complexity arises because
many Annex 401 specific rules require that a good must meet a
minimum regional value-content before it is granted originating
status.1" This means that a designated percentage of the value
of the good must be from the NAFTA territory. According to
Article 402, producers may select one of two methods for calcu-
lating value content: (1) the transactional value method, or (2)
164. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A
GUIDE TO CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, supra note 162, at 4.
165. Under the NAFTA rules, regional value content requirements are applied to
forty-two percent of the total number of tariff items. IDB Report Downplayed at
Ministerial Meeting, INSIDE NAFTA, v. 2, no. 13 (June 28, 1995) at 9.
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the net cost method. 16
The transactional method is similar to the method employed
in the European Community.167 It is based on the sale price of
the good upon export in accordance with the Customs Valuation
Code of the GATT, which is designed to reflect actual value.
Because the transactional method allows the producer to count
all of its costs as territorial, it generally requires that sixty per-
cent or more of the cost of the good eligible for preference be
attributable to the value of North American inputs." This
method has the advantage of simplicity.
The NAFTA net cost method remains more or less the same
as under the FTA. It generally requires only fifty percent region-
al value content because it excludes certain costs from the net
cost calculation. 69 The changes made to the net cost method
partly resolved the problem raised in the Honda case because
they eliminated the subjectivity involved in determining which
production costs, such as a proportion of plant overhead, could
be included in the regional value content calculation.'
Other improvements to the FTA origin regime made the
NAFTA origin rules function more effectively. For example, the
NAFTA negotiators devised a provision which permits manufac-
166. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 402.
167. See EC Council Regulation 802/68, Art. 5 (June 27, 1968), 1968 O.J. (L
148) 1, as amended by Council Regulation 1318/71 (June 21, 1971), 1971 O.J. (L
139) 6.
168. The formula for calculating the regional value content under the transac-
tional method is:
RVC = TV-VNMJTV X 100
where,
RVC = regional value content, expressed as a percentage;
TV = the GATT transaction value of a good; and
VNM = the value of non-originating inputs incorporated into the
production of the good.
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A GUIDE TO
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, supra note 162, at 4.
169. The formula for calculating the regional value content under the net cost
method is:
RVC = NC-VNMINC X 100
where,
RVC = regional value content, expressed as a percentage;
TV = the net cost of the good; and
VNM = the value of non-originating inputs incorporated into the
production of the good.
Id. at 5.
170. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 388.
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turers to trace all costs through to the final product in order to
limit the roll-up/roll-down' 71 phenomenon. 172  Tracing im-
proves the accuracy of the value content determination by elimi-
nating the possibility of counting the full value of the compo-
nents incorporated into a finished good as originating or non-
originating content, even though those components may consist
of a combination of originating and non-originating inputs. The
improvements require that any non-NAFTA value remains non-
originating throughout the assembly process until the regional
value content calculation is made. Unfortunately, the tracing
provision applies only to automobiles.
Improvements to the general FTA origin regime evident in
the NAFTA regime solve particular problems encountered in
making origin determinations. Nevertheless, the changes do not
address, but rather add to the fundamental problem of the ori-
gin rules - their trade-inhibiting complexity. This complexity
leads to an insurmountable obstacle for the would-be trader,
particularly the small business owner lacking the time and re-
sources to identify how he or she can benefit from the
NAFTA. 173 Additionally, administration and enforcement of the
rules drains the resources of the customs services of each of the
NAFTA signatories. 74 In short, the origin rules embodied in
the Agreement inhibit trade and complicate regulatory efforts
while, according to the objectives of the NAFTA, they should
lead to the opposite result."'
171. For a discussion of roll-up and roll-down, see supra parts VIII.A.2.a-b.
172. U.S. CUSTOMS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A GUIDE TO
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, supra note 162, at 59.
173. See, cf, The Administration's Case for NAFTA- Testimony of Ambassador
Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative, Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, Federal Document Clearing House, Sept. 14, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (testimony of Ambassador Michael Kantor de-
scribing small business owners as ill-equipped to wrestle with the tariff and licens-
ing requirements).
174. See Enforcing Rules of Origin Requirements under the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, 1991: Hearing before the Comm. on Finance of the U.S. Sen-
ate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1991), at 6 (statement of Hon. Carol Hallett, Commis-
sioner, U.S. Customs Service) (citing the demands of the Canada-U.S. FTA on the
limited resources of the Customs Service).
175. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 102(1)(a) (articulating a NAFTA objective to
eliminate barriers to trade in, and to simplify the cross border movement of, goods
and services between the territories of the Parties).
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4. The Computer Rule
In addition to the general origin rules based on CTH and
regional value content, the NAFTA includes several special pro-
visions for conferring origin. Article 308 and Annex 308.1 em-
body one such provision. 7 ' Taken together, they govern the ap-
proach to origin determinations for computers and related goods.
As noted in Part III above, the rule for computers departs from
the origin rules found elsewhere in the accord. Canada, Mexico,
and the U.S. agreed to harmonize external tariffs on computers
and related goods in a series of staged reductions over ten years.
The imposition of a common external tariff (CET) for computers
is a constructive precedent. Substantial benefits will accrue to
the hemisphere if the computer rule is employed as a model
upon the enlargement of the NAFTA and the creation of the
176. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 308 & Annex 308.1 provide:
Article 308: Most-Favored-Nation Rates of Duty on Certain Goods
1. Annex 308.1 applies to certain automatic data processing goods
and their parts.
2. Annex 308.2 applies to certain color television tubes.
3. Each Party shall accord most-favored-nation duty-free treatment
to any local area network apparatus imported into its territory, and shall
consult in accordance with Annex 308.3.
Annex 308.1: Most-Favored-Nation Rates of Duty on Certain Automatic
Data Processing Goods and Their Parts Section A - General Provisions
1. Each Party shall reduce its most-favored-nation rate of duty
applicable to a good provided for under the tariff provisions set out in
Tables 308.1.1 and 308.1.2 in Section B to the rate set out therein, to
the lowest rate agreed by any Party in the Uruguay Round of Multilater-
al Trade Negotiations, or to such reduced rate as the Parties may agree,
in accordance with the schedule set out in Section B, or with such accel-
erated schedule as the Parties may agree.
2. Notwithstanding Chapter Four (Rules of Origin), when the
most-favored-nation rate of duty applicable to a good provided for under
the tariff provisions set out in Table 308.1.1 in Section B conforms with
the rate established under paragraph 1, each Party shall consider the
good, when imported into its territory from the territory of another Par-
ty, to be an originating good.
3. A Party may reduce in advance of the schedule set out in Ta-
ble 308.1.1 or Table 308.1.2 in Section B, or of such accelerated schedule
as the Parties may agree, its most-favored-nation rate of duty applicable
to any good provided for under the tariff provisions set out therein, to
the lowest rate agreed by any Party in the Uruguay Round of Multilater-
al Trade Negotiations, or the rate set out in Table 308.1.1 or 308.1.2, or
to such reduced rate as the Parties may agree.
4. For greater certainty, most-favored-nation rate of duty does not
include any other concessionary rate of duty.
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FTAA. The following examples demonstrate the win-win nature
of the computer provision for NAFTA members and non-mem-
bers alike.177
a. FTAA Member Benefits
The NAFTA members benefit from the computer rule. The
rule provides originating status to any computer hardware item
from non-Parties, if the MFN rate of duty was applied upon its
shipment into the NAFTA region. In other words, non-originat-
ing computer goods receive NAFTA preferential treatment de-
spite their actual origin when shipped to and from Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. Thus, a company that imports a
non-originating computer component for incorporation into a
computer system pays duty on that component only upon initial
importation into the NAFTA territory. Moreover, the duty is
paid at the lowest MFN rate of any of the NAFTA signato-
ries."7 ' The company can ship the part throughout the NAFTA
territory for processing unencumbered by tariffs. When the part
is incorporated into the company's final computer product and
shipped to markets in other signatory states, no tariffs apply.
Thus, the rule encourages intra-FTA multiple country manufac-
turing. Due to the computer rule, the company involved in the
computer trade dispenses with the need for burdensome value
content determinations and tariff heading tracking. Computers
are traded tariff free within North America, without regard to
rules of origin. As a result, businesses involved in the North
American computer trade enjoy substantial resource savings.
The U.S. Customs Service and its counterpart organizations in
Canada and Mexico will enjoy similar resource savings as moni-
toring the computer trade to ensure compliance with origin rule
requirements will become unnecessary. In sum, the extension of
the computer rule to other goods will diminish the number and
the rate of tariffs within the NAFTA region as well as the need
for the expensive and time-consuming monitoring required to
ensure compliance.
177. The examples presented here were extracted from the author's discussion
with Clay Woods, International Trade Specialist. Personal communication with Clay
Woods, International Trade Administration, Trade Development, Office of Computers,
(March 7, 1995).




The benefit of the computer rule to countries that are not
members of the NAFTA derives from Annex 308.1(A)(1), which
establishes that NAFTA members must harmonize their MFN
duties on computers downward to the lowest rate of any mem-
ber. A fictitious Asian computer manufacturer illustrates the
advantages of the computer rule to NAFTA non-members. In the
absence of the NAFTA provisions, if the Asian manufacturer
imports a computer component into the NAFTA territory, it
would be subject to the individual tariff rate established in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the country into which the
company imported the good. Currently, computers entering the
United States under tariff heading 8471.20 are subject to a 3.9%
MFN duty.179 Computers entering Mexico under HTS heading
8471.20 are subject to a duty of twenty percent."B Assume the
firm imports computer components into the U.S. for processing
prior to export to Mexico for final sale. The company would be
required to pay a 3.9% tariff on any component that it ships to
the United States. Unless it satisfies the origin rules, when the
component is shipped to Mexico the company would be assessed
additional duties (most probably twenty percent depending on
the form of the finished good). To eliminate the twenty percent
Mexican duty and receive tariff-free entry into Mexico under the
NAFTA origin rules generally applicable to products other than
computers, the company would be required to show that the
component (1) underwent a substantial transformation in
NAFTA territory sufficient to prompt a tariff shift; (2) incorpo-
rated the requisite North American value content; or (3) both (1)
and (2). Without the computer rule, if the company could not
make this showing, Mexico would assess a duty on the product
as a non-originating good.
Under Article 308 and Annex 308.1, downward harmoniza-
tion will be complete within ten years of the signing of the
NAFTA. At that time, the manufacturer will face the same rate
of duty (3.9%) when shipping the component into any one of the
179. Intl Trade Comm'n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Ch.
84 (1994 & Supp. 1 & 2) (adopted pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1202).
180. NAFTA, supra note 20, Annex 302.2 (Tariff Schedule of Mexico).
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NAFTA signatories. Once a computer component enters NAFTA
territory, the company can ship that component within NAFTA
territory freely regardless of whether or not the imported compo-
nent undergoes a manufacturing process sufficiently significant
to prompt a "substantial transformation" or result in the cre-
ation of a good that is at least fifty percent North American. In
other words, the company is not required to make any showing
that it satisfied the NAFTA rules of origin.
The potential benefit of the CET to the Asian manufacturer
is substantial.181 Upon full implementation in 2005, if the
Asian company ships directly to Mexico, it will encounter a tariff
of only 3.9% versus the current rate of twenty percent.182 Thus,
the Asian firm has the opportunity to save $161 for every $1000
worth of computers shipped to Mexico. 1" In addition to these
direct savings, the computer rule is easy to understand and
apply. The Asian firm will eliminate the costly administrative
burdens of origin determinations. Also, the Asian firm can
choose its point of entry into the NAFTA territory based on
efficiency considerations, rather than tariff treatment. In theory,
both the direct and indirect savings will eventually reach con-
sumers. The mandatory tariff reduction will improve the avail-
ability and price of computers, especially in the case of Mexico,
which imposed comparatively high tariffs on computers prior to
the start of the harmonization program.
The imposition of a CET creates greater trade liberalization
than is available with an approach that requires compliance
with the trade-inhibiting origin rule requirements. There are
other advantages in addition to the practical ones outlined
above. Because the rule harmonizes the common external tariff
downward, even non-member countries can benefit from its ex-
tension. If extended, the rule will support the theoretical claim
181. Based on the calculations above, for every $1 million of computers shipped
through the U.S. to Mexico for final sale, the firm will save $161,000. This figure
represents the direct savings. They accrue to the company without any additional
resource expenditure. In fact, the computer rule eliminates expenditures on rules of
origin compliance measures. Thus, the total savings are significantly greater than
the direct savings stated above.
182. NAFTA, supra note 20, Annex 308.1(A)(3).
183. The Mexican tariff = 20%; 20% x $1000 = $200. The lowest MFN rate =
the U.S. tariff = 3.9%; 3.9% x $1000 = $39. $200 minus $39 = $161 savings in du-
ties assessed. This calculation compares the pre-Agreement tariff rates with the
rates that will be established upon full implementation of the computer rule.
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that the NAFTA is a stepping stone to freer trade globally, rath-
er than a protectionist bloc developed as a counterbalance to the
European Economic Community. Reliance on the computer rule
model will enable integrationists to rebut claims that the FTAA
is a protectionist scheme designed to hinder European and Asian
entry into American markets.
c. Potential Problems, Incrementalism, and the Computer
Rule
An extension of the computer rule would be a sensible poli-
cy, but it is not without its problems. The extension of the com-
puter rule will not resolve all origin determination issues defini-
tively. Also, it will create additional issues that must be ad-
dressed if it is to be used effectively in the context of an FTAA
or an enlarged NAFTA. Lastly, the imposition of the computer
rule will have to overcome substantial obstacles to implementa-
tion, due to special interest involvement in the formulation of
the rules of free trade and the novelty of the approach recom-
mended here.
i. Remaining Origin Issues
The computer rule is not a panacea for all origin-related
problems. The imposition of a CET would eliminate the need for
origin rules only of the type applied in the Honda case. It would
not eliminate the need for origin rules entirely. For example,
some type of origin regime will remain necessary for statistical
purposes and marking requirements." 4 Also, a mechanism to
distinguish goods originating in GSP beneficiary developing
countries from other imports will continue to be necessary. Nev-
ertheless, the imposition of a CET would resolve the problems
involved in making origin determinations for multiple country
manufactures and thereby eliminate an obstacle to the imple-
mentation of an FTAA.
184. For a discussion of marking requirements for imports under 19 U.S.C.A. §




The elimination of rules of origin in favor of a CET creates a
new set of issues that must be resolved. For example, the distri-
bution of revenue generated from the common external tariff
assessed as goods -are imported into the NAFTA territory pres-
ents a substantial problem. As Mexico reduces its tariff rate on
computers from twenty percent to 3.9%, the Mexican govern-
ment will incur significant revenue losses. Mexico will lose even
more revenue if companies from non-Parties ship the majority of
computers through the U.S., and then to Mexico. Thus, the
NAFTA signatories must establish some means of distributing
the revenues garnered from the external tariff on computers
imported into the NAFTA territory. There are several possibili-
ties. One solution would be to deposit the CET revenues into an
account for infrastructure development projects, which could be
administered by the Inter-American Development Bank. A sec-
ond option is to direct the revenues to a centralized inter-Ameri-
can environmental defense fund. This approach would facilitate
environmental protection efforts and help to diminish the nega-
tive impact of the environmental lobby's opposition to free trade
in the Americas.
iii. Overcoming Special Interests
The environmental lobby is not the only special interest
group with active interests in the evolution of free trade ar-
rangements. The formulation of specific NAFTA provisions like
the rules of origin was a highly politicized process. A brief re-
view of the Annex to the NAFTA Chapter on Rules of Origin
reveals the level of special interest involvement in the drafting
of the origin rules. For example, the automobile and textile in-
dustries were able to demand special rules of origin applicable to
their industries.'" These provisions complicate the origin re-
gime. The extension of the computer provision will eliminate
these complicating provisions but not without substantial politi-
cal opposition. Industries protected by a tariff (even as low as
185. NAFTA, supra note 20, Annex 401 (describing what are commonly termed




3.9%, as with computers and related goods) undoubtedly will
fight the extension of the rule to their industries because it
would result in a loss of tariff protection with respect to trade
from other FTA members. Moreover, the rule will eliminate the
protection provided by origin requirements against trade from
FTA non-members. Thus, companies from non-member states
will gain access to the NAFTA market more easily than before.
In sum, the loss of this protection is bound to lead to political
opposition, which will be a significant challenge for
integrationists seeking an extension of the computer rule.
Another obstacle to the implementation of the suggestion
made here is its novelty. The NAFTA computer rule is buried in
an obscure annex. Only those involved in the computer industry
or students of the trade accord are likely to know of its exis-
tence. This Article assumes an unorthodox position, primarily
because the U.S. trade liberalization program for the Americas
urges the creation of a free trade area, not a customs union."' 6
The essential difference between the two is that the customs
union has a common external tariff.87 The leaders in the
hemisphere who endorsed the creation of the FTAA ought to
work to implement a CET, incrementally. Given the power of
the textile and automobile lobbies, the result is likely to be a
bifurcated trade accord or an FTA-customs union hybrid. Some
goods will trade under a common external tariff. Others, like
textiles and automobiles, will continue to trade under rules
traditionally associated with an FTA. Those rules allow for
member states of a free trade area to maintain their individual
(external) tariff scheme and require that traded goods must sat-
isfy origin requirements in order to receive the preferential tariff
treatment bargained for during free trade negotiations. The
imposition of a CET should be pursued as the modus operandi of
186. The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), however, aims to create
a common market. Treaty of Montevideo 1980, supra note 37. See supra Parts V.B.
& V.C. discussing the LAFTA and the LAIA, which were established by the Treaties
of Montevideo of 1960 and 1980, respectively. The texts of both of these South
American-based integration initiatives demonstrate the existence of a long-standing
trade liberalization program with the objective of the eventual imposition of a com-
mon external tariff. The extension of the NAFTA computer rule proposed here would
achieve that end. It is ironic that the rule is lauded as one of the NAFTA's most
innovative provisions. Its use in the creation of the FTAA is a viable option for
resolving the origin problem, and a solution that will accomplish what Latin Ameri-
can integrationists have aspired to for more than thirty years.
187. See GATT, supra note 27, art. XXIII.
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FTAA implementation, despite the political obstacles outlined
above. It would eliminate the origin rule requirements for trad-
ers from FTAA member states, and thereby further liberalize
trade in the Americas. Moreover, non-members would benefit as
well.
IX. LEARNING FROM COMPUTERS: THE FTAA BUILDING BLOCK
The Summit of the Americas mandate to unify the many
hemispheric trade agreements poses many problems for negotia-
tors. One critical question they must resolve is which origin
regime, of those that are operative in the Americas, should gov-
ern origin determinations in the FTAA. The computer rule pres-
ents a viable option. Working groups established at the Summit
and within the NAFTA negotiating framework must adopt the
origin rule as their FTAA building block."
The combination of economic and political implications of
Chile's accession to the NAFTA make it an opportune time to set
important precedents. Chile is a comparatively small market for
U.S. products and the economic impact of its accession to the
NAFTA on the U.S. will probably be slight.189 However, the po-
litical implications for all of the Americas are significant. Chile's
accession is the first of the many North-South linkages that will
be necessary for the establishment of the FTAA. Furthermore, it
will send a signal to the countries of Latin America regarding
the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to an FTAA. An addi-
tional benefit is that the particulars of Chile's accession will be
scrutinized and evaluated by each potential NAFTA acceder.
Negotiators must demonstrate that they have learned from
computers by declaring their intent to incrementally impose a
CET. This would establish a workable norm at the outset of the
FTAA implementation process. Subsequently, each country en-
tering NAFTA accession negotiations will have settled expecta-
tions regarding the origin rules, which have been a primary
sticking point in past initiatives intended to liberalize trade. Re-
liance on the computer rule model will allow negotiators to focus
their attention on the time-frame for the downward harmoniza-
188. For a discussion of the origin rule working groups, see supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text.
189. See FOSTER & ALEXANDER, supra note 63, at 101.
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tion of the external tariffs of each signatory country to the MFN
level of the signatory with the lowest tariff for each good. In
sum, the use of the NAFTA computer rule example can make
the accession process a manageable one.
The long-term ramifications of Chile's smooth entry into the
NAFTA are significant. The NAFTA accession clause, Article
2205, provides in general terms for the addition of new mem-
bers.19 Currently, the focus is Chile's successful accession.
Article 2204, however, does not limit accessions to the countries
of the Americas. In the future, the FTAA could include members
from Asia and Europe. Doubts about the likelihood of such a
proposal becoming a reality are understandable given the diffi-
culties presented by integration in the Western Hemisphere.
Nonetheless, there are positive signs. For example, in May of
1995, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor announced the
need for exploratory discussions regarding a transatlantic free
trade area between the U.S. and the EC.' 9' The successful en-
largement of the NAFTA will encourage such efforts. In this
sense, the precedents set by the Chilean accession have the
potential to influence the course of global liberalization pro-
grams beyond the year 2005 and the establishment of the FTAA.
X. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates the importance of identifying an
innovative solution for the kinds of origin rule problems evi-
denced by the Honda controversy. The current rules are prob-
lematic and undermine many of the advances that the NAFTA
and its expansion would otherwise bring to the region. Several
efforts to resolve the issues related to origin determinations
have failed. Nevertheless, negotiators have initiated a program
to expand the NAFTA and establish an FTAA. Without a stan-
dardized rule or some other means of resolving the problems
presented by origin rules, the obstacles they confront will be
formidable.
The current origin regime inhibits the expansion of the
NAFTA in at least three ways. First, the CTH test relies on the
190. NAFTA, supra note 20, art. 2205.




Harmonized Tariff System, which was not designed for origin
determinations. Thus, the HTS change of tariff heading ap-
proach requires complicated exceptions and special provisions
that complicate matters for those engaged in or monitoring in-
ternational trade. Second, regional value content tests require
complicated and costly administration and bookkeeping, as well
as subjective interpretations that are open to dispute. Also, they
discriminate against countries like Chile and Mexico whose
lower wage rates make it difficult to confer origin through pro-
cesses that in the U.S. or Canada would confer origin based on
value added. These discriminatory effects will grow in impor-
tance as the NAFTA membership becomes dominated by coun-
tries with wage rates more like those of Mexico than those of the
United States. Third, the NAFTA origin regime creates unneces-
sary burdens on shippers and producers which prompt them to
forego preferential treatment. When they do so, it negates any
benefits of the carefully negotiated Agreement to liberalize
trade. These burdens have resulted in calls for new standardiza-
tion initiatives.'92 Yet, standardization efforts have been un-
successful in the past. A new approach is needed.
The computer rule is the NAFTA negotiators' primary inno-
vation. Despite its novelty, the leaders who participated in the
Summit of the Americas must impose a CET on a broader scale.
The CET will eliminate, within the NAFTA territory, complicat-
ed origin rules for multiple country manufactures. It will mark a
fundamental departure from a past marked by failed integration
initiatives. The arithmetic provided in the hypothetical case of
an Asian computer firm presented above provides a supportive
rationale for the adoption of the computer rule model for use in
the FTAA. With each subsequent NAFTA accession, negotiators
must grant common market treatment to those goods that will
generate the least political opposition. Chile's NAFTA accession
is the first opportunity. The trading community's growing aware-
ness of the superior uniformity, simplicity, predictability, and
administrability'93 of the computer rule approach will prompt
192. According to Tim Fairchild, corporate customs manager at Compaq Comput-
er Corporation, "Harmonization is an absolute necessity. The fact that there is a
degree of harmonization at all right now allows me to do my job without having a
staff of 200 people to keep track of the different rules." Ken Cottrill, supra note 49,
at 8.
193. For a discussion of the U.S. International Trade Commission report which
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lobbyists to urge its adoption for the products of the industries
they represent. Ultimately, goods from the automobile and tex-
tile industries will trade under a CET. Upon the creation of the
FTAA, the governments in the Americas will have established a
harmonized external tariff for all goods. The advantages that
accrue from the adoption of the rule will transform it from an
unorthodox recommendation to the preferred response to the
origin rule problem and the modus operandi of the FTAA.
Curiously, it is computers that can provide us with advance-
ments in international trade law on the order of those that they
have brought in so many other sectors since the advent of the
information age. This time, however, the advancements brought
on by computers originate from their tariff treatment. Sim6n
Bolivar's successors must not fail to recognize that the extension
of the computer rule is just the sensible plan and well-directed
action that Bolivar pronounced would be necessary to integrate
the Americas.
established these four criteria to evaluate any new approach to origin determina-
tions, see supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
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